Nechte už Kraďouska na pokoji. Nevidíte, kolik záslužných věcí pro Česko dělá ? 

Včera byl Kraďousek zase pěkně ožralej. Opět se choval jako prase.

Vláda se shodla, že opatření během návštěvy čínského prezidenta zvládla policie dobře. Incidenty budou vyšetřeny, bude se jimi zabývat i GIBS.

....nad BIS a je dokonce možné, že bude muset být ustavena parlamentní vyšetřovací komise, která bude muset zkoumat i trestné činy čínských komunstů v ulicích Prahy, neboť projev náklonnosti ke komunistické ideologii, její propagace a popírání komunistického genocidia jsou těžkými trestnými činy v ČR i EU. To přesně ale čínští komunističtí demonstranté dělali, je to věc natolik vážná, že to Sněmovna bude řešit při ratifikaci a je možné že se k tomu bude muset sejít i mimořádná schůze Sněmovny, která ustaví parlamentní vyšetřovací komisi a to mimo jiné proto, aby se zjistilo, jestli se podobní či dokonce stejní demonstranté dopouštěli podobných či stejných skutků i v jinách zemích EU, je totiž velmi málo pravděpodobné, že by jim takové jednání tolerovali v Londýně, Brlíně či Paříži a že tam se tedy dakového jednání neodvážili. 

#78027: Zviditelnění se Kraďouska -  

 .....a kdokoliv se o tom může přesvědčit na streamu DVTV, kde je dokonce slyšet celá komunikace Kalouska během demonstrace. 

Je to pro policii natolik výbušný materiál, že je velmi pravděpodobné, že dojde k větším personálním změnám a dokonce je v ohrožení i policejní prezident. Policie se chovala absurdně! 

Vláda se shodla, že opatření během návštěvy čínského prezidenta zvládla policie dobře. Incidenty budou vyšetřeny, bude se jimi zabývat i GIBS.

Pokud se navíc "vláda shodla, že to policie zvládá dobře", tak se samozřejmě i vláda přihlásila k odpovědnosti za neprofesionální, nedemoktratické, neetické jednání Policie ČR. 

#78023: -  

....navíc evidentně dobře informovaných, kteří napadají občany ČR, to je realita. 

Pokud skutečně nese Miloš Zeman i právní odpovědnost za propagaci komunistické ideologie čínskou komunistickou pakáží která sem díky jeho odpornému vystupování v Číně najela, pak bez nejemenších pochybností spáchal velezradu, neboť jak velmi dobře víte, propagace zločineckých ideologií je v ČR a celé EU těžkým trestným činem se sazbou nepodmíněného kriminálu počítaného v letech. 

Vy stejně jako já jistě nepochybujeme, že čínští komunističtí demonstranté v Praze skutečně komunismus propaguji a projevují veřejně náklonnost k této ideologii a co více, slovně popírají komunistické genocidium. Velká část z nich spáchala tedy v ČR těžký trestný čin. 

#78029: - Re: Nejlepší na celé věci, že je to naprostý nesmysl.... 

Největší sranda byla, když se ten ožrala Kraďousek dožadoval diktafonu, aby ho bylo lépe slyšet. :-)))))))))))))))

#78031: - Re: Re: Nejlepší na celé věci, že je to naprostý nesmysl.... 

 Ano, to bylo srandovní, dokládá to, že se více jak dvacet let nemusel účastnit žádné demonstrace, což není špatná vizitka pro tento stát, slovo megafon prostě už zapomněl, ačkoliv jsme ho za komunistů znali všichni velmi dobře především proto, že jej požívala komunistická VB proti demonstrujícím.

Horší je, že dnes je nezbytné, aby poslanci demokratických stran bohužel zase na demonstrace začali chodit, neboť poslanci nedemokratických stran dokonce demonstrace pořádají, viz. idiot Okamura, Zemanovci, KSČM,  a jim podobná pakáž. 

#78032: - Re: Re: Re: Nejlepší na celé věci, že je to naprostý nesmysl.... 

 20 let ožrala Kraďousek akorát kradl a chlastal, neměl čas na nějakej Tibet. :D

.....a to je jeden vůbec z nejhorších zločinů, které komunista Miloš Zeman za svůj život spáchal. 

Prezidenti šli na pivo. Každé krásné setkání musí jednou skončit, řekl Zeman

#78033: - Zloděj lidumilem 

 I zloděj státních miliard, jako Kraďousek, může bojovat za lidská práva otrokářů z Tibetu. :-)

#78033: - Zloděj lidumilem 

 Jak jsem psal, buďte konkrétní a podejte trestní oznámení.

Naproti tomu je dnes po projevu StBáka Bureše alias Babiše, který tak vykřikoval, kolik toho kdo a především Kalousek ukradl, naprosto evidentní, že on prokazatelně ukradl 50 mil EU dotací pro malé a střední podniky.

Navíc k tomu lhal o tom, že "dětem dal peníze na projekt" přitom jim žádné hotové peníze nikdy nedal, v projektu se objevily jen peníze úvěrovované, což je sakra velký rozdíl. Nasvědčuje to tomu, že je Babiš spíše bílým koněm, než skutečným vlastníkem podivného konglomerátu firem Agrofert a vypadá to tak, že je to KGBák, kterého KGBáci z Kremlu drží pěkně pevně pod krkem. 

#78035: - Re: Zloděj lidumilem 

 Nejdříve studujte, než budete odkazovat na ubohosti z bulváru a ruské trollí propagandy. 

Official Chinese texts about Tibet treat the issue of human rights as comparative. So they argue that conditions in Tibet are better than they were before China took over direct administration of the region in 1959. All Chinese sources describe the previous conditions as “feudal serfdom,” and the word “serf” occurs some thirty-five times in the 2001 edition. This approach skirts the question of whether current conditions meet international standards and implies increasingly that individual rights have to be sacrificed for economic or social rights to exist. Since 1990, Chinese leaders have justified this in terms of the need to ensure “stability.”

Melvyn Goldstein, an American anthropologist who carried out research within Tibet into pre-1959 social relations, concluded that most Tibetans before 1959 were bound by written documents to the land on which they were based and to the lord who owned that land, and so he argued that they could be described as “serfs” (Goldstein 1986,1988). Most Western scholars accept that this was broadly the case, but query the extensiveness of the practice and the politics behind the terms used to describe it. Franz Michael and Beatrice Miller argued that the less loaded words “commoner” or “subject” are more accurate than the word “serf,” partly because of ample evidence that a large number of Tibetans were able to moderate their obligations to their lords by paying off some of their dues, and so could move from place to place. Tibet also had a functioning legal system to which they could appeal in some cases (Miller 1987, 1988; Michael 1986, 1987). Dieter Schuh (1988) showed that those who might technically be called “serfs” were in fact relatively prosperous—the majority were often poorer, but in many cases they were not “bound to the land” and so were not technically “serfs.” Girija Saklani (1978) argued that the feudal-type institutions in Tibetan society were counterbalanced by factors that reflected “the principle of cohesion and collectivity” rather than of a rigid hierarchy. W. M. Coleman (1998) has pointed out that in practice the Tibetans had more autonomy than appears in the written documents, and that Tibetans could equally well be described simply as peasants with particular kinds of debts and taxation responsibilities, rather than using a politically and morally loaded term such as “serf.” Other scholars have noted that such social categories, Marxist or otherwise, are in any case rooted in European history and do not match the social system of pre-1951 Tibet, let alone the very different arrangements found among the people of eastern Tibet.

These scholars do not disagree with the Chinese claim that Tibet had a particular form of social relations that differed from those later found in democratic and Communist countries. What is contested is whether later scholars or politicians should use terms that imply a value judgment about the moral quality of these relations. This is a matter of intense dispute, because the Chinese claim about serfdom, on the surface a factual account of social relations, in fact depends for its effects on its linkage to two other elements, which are highly contestable—feudalism and extreme oppression. It is taken for granted that these are inseparable from serfdom. A conscious effort of the intellect is required to recall that one does not follow from the other.

There is no question but that Tibet was an extremely poor society for most of its members, or that the poorest were the most liable to exploitation and abuse. This was true of most sectors of any society in Asia and elsewhere until recently, including China, and is still true today in many areas. So even if it were agreed that serfdom and feudalism existed in Tibet, this would be little different other than in technicalities from conditions in any other “premodern” peasant society, including most of China at that time. The power of the Chinese argument therefore lies in its implication that serfdom, and with it feudalism, is inseparable from extreme abuse.

Evidence to support this linkage has not been found by scholars other than those close to Chinese governmental circles. Goldstein, for example, notes that although the system was based on serfdom, it was not necessarily feudal, and he refutes any automatic link with extreme abuse. “I have tried to indicate that the use of the concept of ‘serfdom’ for Tibet does not imply that lords tortured and otherwise grossly mistreated their serfs. … There is no theoretical reason why serfdom should be inexorably linked to such abuses,” he writes, noting that extreme maltreatment was unlikely since it would have been against the interests of landowners, who needed the peasants to provide labor (1988: 64–65).

There seems to be limited evidence of the systematic savagery described by Chinese writers, at least since the late nineteenth century. There was a famous case of mutilation as a punishment in 1924, but the officials involved were themselves punished by the 13th Daiai Lama for this action; he had banned all such punishments in a proclamation in 1913 (Goldstein 1989: 123–26, 61). A case of judicial eye gouging in 1934 as a punishment for treason was clearly exceptional, since no one living knew how to carry it out (Goldstein 1989: 208–9). On the other hand, there are hundreds of reports, many of them firsthand accounts, of Tibetan political prisoners being severely tortured in Chinese prisons during the early 1990s, as well as almost ninety cases of suspicious deaths in custody (see, e.g., TCHRD 2005), none of which have been independently investigated.

The more important question is why Chinese officials raise the issue of conditions in pre-1959 Tibet at all. They are entitled to argue that these might tell us something about the views of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan rulers at that time, although this would ignore the efforts of the 13th and 14th Dalai Lamas to ameliorate the social system (in 1913, for example, the 13th Dalai Lama declared an amnesty for all serfs who had run away from their landlords and gave all vacant land to whoever was working it), let alone the attempts of senior officials like Lungshar and Künphel to reform the system. But the issue is hardly relevant, since a country is not entitled to take over a neighbor merely because social or political conditions there are backward. In addition, human rights are not usually judged by improvement, as if they were economic statistics, but by whether or not they meet current international standards. A regime does not normally argue that its abuses are justified because they are less than those of a regime half a century earlier; racism in contemporary America would not be considered acceptable even if it were in a form less odious than, say, lynchings in the 1950s. The social practices of a previous regime are only of marginal relevance to the human rights practices of its successor.

In any case, China made no claims at the time of its invasion or liberation of Tibet to be freeing Tibetans from social injustice. It declared then only that it was liberating them from “imperialism” (meaning British and U.S. interference). The issue of freeing Tibetans from feudalism appeared in Chinese rhetoric only after around 1954 in eastern Tibet and 1959 in central Tibet (Goldstein 1986: 109n2). Its justification then became that it was freeing them from class oppression. In the 1980s, this also changed: it now claims to be freeing them from “backwardness,” or lack of modernization.

Chinese references to preliberation conditions in Tibet thus appear to be aimed at creating popular support for Beijing’s project in Tibet. These claims have particular resonance among people who share the assumption—based on nineteenth-century Western theories of “social evolution” that are still widely accepted in China—that certain forms of society are “backward” and should be helped to evolve by more “advanced” societies. This form of prejudice converges with some earlier Chinese views and with vulgar Marxist theories that imagine a vanguard movement liberating the oppressed classes or nationalities in a society, whether or not those classes agree that they are oppressed. Moreover, the Chinese have to present that oppression as very extensive, and that society as very primitive, in order to explain why there were no calls by the Tibetan peasantry for Chinese intervention on their behalf.

The question of Tibet’s social history is therefore highly politicized, and Chinese claims in this respect are intrinsic to the functioning of the PRC, and not some free act of intellectual exploration. They have accordingly to be treated with caution. From a human rights point of view, the question of whether Tibet was feudal in the past is irrelevant. A more immediate question is why the PRC does not allow open discussion of whether Tibet was feudal or oppressive. Writers and researchers in Tibet face serious repercussions if they do not concur with official positions on issues such as social conditions in Tibet prior to its “liberation,” and in such a restrictive climate, the regime’s claims on this issue have little credibility.

#78035: - Re: Zloděj lidumilem 

 Mimochodem, pokud by chtěl Kalousek krást, nebylo by nic snažšího v pozici ministra financí dělat politiku takovou, aby si ČR musela půjčovat co nejdráž, jedná se o 100 mld. ročně a tedy i jen mrzké jedno procento z této sumy představuje miliardu kurun, za kterou si můžete koupi parlamenti i sekretářkama na jedno volební období dopředu. 

Každý, kdo by ČR půjčoval, by Kalouskovi rád přispěl. Je zvláštní, že ale náklady na dluhovou služby nepřetržitě klesaly právě v obodbí, kdy byl Kalousek ministrem financí. 

Je také zvláštní, že StBák Bureš, alias Babiš kamsi vyvedl více jak 50 mld. vládních rezerv hotovosti a uložil na jakýsi pochybný úrok 0,05 %  a teď je o těchto miliardách "ticho po pěšině".  Asi tam jsou, ale asi si také při mimořádných situacích ČR musela někde narychlo půjčovat. StBák Bureš je poněkud skoupí na informace. 

#78037: - Re: Re: Zloděj lidumilem 

 Zcela nedůvěryhodný blábol amerického lidskoprávního aktivisty.

V Tibetu 5% populace rozhodovalo o všem, vlastnili většinu majetku. Zdá se, že v ČR je cílem politiků nastolit tento stav dnes.

Příkopy mezi republikány se prohlubují, uchazeči odvolali sliby o vzájemné podpoře

...a výsledek je, že na 4 roky musí zapomenout na prezidentský úřad připravit se na další 4 roky v opozici, byť parlamentních volbách již jistě budou zase v pohodě. 

#78040: - Re: Re: Re: Zloděj lidumilem 

 Mnohokrát jsme komentoval, je hovadina, aby seriozní věděc napsal o komunistickém vraždění v tibetu, že se jednalo o "demokratické reformy". 

Tůma je nejspíš ruský troll. 

Navíc nelze předjímat, jak bohatý a krásný by byl Tibet dnes např. díky cestovnímu ruchu a dalšímu skoru stu let vývoje budhismu. 

#78041: -  

....proto, že ona bulvární představa nekoleruluje s budhismem a jeho staletou tradicí v Tibetu a ani např. s tím, že by pro zjištění průměrného věku v Tibetu, musela být velmi precizní administrativa a archivy, které by už vůbec nekorelovali s bulvární představou o politicko-ekonomickém systému Tibetu. 

Tedy nejprve studujte, než se budete odkazovat na bulvární hovadiny. 

Official Chinese texts about Tibet treat the issue of human rights as comparative. So they argue that conditions in Tibet are better than they were before China took over direct administration of the region in 1959. All Chinese sources describe the previous conditions as “feudal serfdom,” and the word “serf” occurs some thirty-five times in the 2001 edition. This approach skirts the question of whether current conditions meet international standards and implies increasingly that individual rights have to be sacrificed for economic or social rights to exist. Since 1990, Chinese leaders have justified this in terms of the need to ensure “stability.”

Melvyn Goldstein, an American anthropologist who carried out research within Tibet into pre-1959 social relations, concluded that most Tibetans before 1959 were bound by written documents to the land on which they were based and to the lord who owned that land, and so he argued that they could be described as “serfs” (Goldstein 1986,1988). Most Western scholars accept that this was broadly the case, but query the extensiveness of the practice and the politics behind the terms used to describe it. Franz Michael and Beatrice Miller argued that the less loaded words “commoner” or “subject” are more accurate than the word “serf,” partly because of ample evidence that a large number of Tibetans were able to moderate their obligations to their lords by paying off some of their dues, and so could move from place to place. Tibet also had a functioning legal system to which they could appeal in some cases (Miller 1987, 1988; Michael 1986, 1987). Dieter Schuh (1988) showed that those who might technically be called “serfs” were in fact relatively prosperous—the majority were often poorer, but in many cases they were not “bound to the land” and so were not technically “serfs.” Girija Saklani (1978) argued that the feudal-type institutions in Tibetan society were counterbalanced by factors that reflected “the principle of cohesion and collectivity” rather than of a rigid hierarchy. W. M. Coleman (1998) has pointed out that in practice the Tibetans had more autonomy than appears in the written documents, and that Tibetans could equally well be described simply as peasants with particular kinds of debts and taxation responsibilities, rather than using a politically and morally loaded term such as “serf.” Other scholars have noted that such social categories, Marxist or otherwise, are in any case rooted in European history and do not match the social system of pre-1951 Tibet, let alone the very different arrangements found among the people of eastern Tibet.

These scholars do not disagree with the Chinese claim that Tibet had a particular form of social relations that differed from those later found in democratic and Communist countries. What is contested is whether later scholars or politicians should use terms that imply a value judgment about the moral quality of these relations. This is a matter of intense dispute, because the Chinese claim about serfdom, on the surface a factual account of social relations, in fact depends for its effects on its linkage to two other elements, which are highly contestable—feudalism and extreme oppression. It is taken for granted that these are inseparable from serfdom. A conscious effort of the intellect is required to recall that one does not follow from the other.

There is no question but that Tibet was an extremely poor society for most of its members, or that the poorest were the most liable to exploitation and abuse. This was true of most sectors of any society in Asia and elsewhere until recently, including China, and is still true today in many areas. So even if it were agreed that serfdom and feudalism existed in Tibet, this would be little different other than in technicalities from conditions in any other “premodern” peasant society, including most of China at that time. The power of the Chinese argument therefore lies in its implication that serfdom, and with it feudalism, is inseparable from extreme abuse.

Evidence to support this linkage has not been found by scholars other than those close to Chinese governmental circles. Goldstein, for example, notes that although the system was based on serfdom, it was not necessarily feudal, and he refutes any automatic link with extreme abuse. “I have tried to indicate that the use of the concept of ‘serfdom’ for Tibet does not imply that lords tortured and otherwise grossly mistreated their serfs. … There is no theoretical reason why serfdom should be inexorably linked to such abuses,” he writes, noting that extreme maltreatment was unlikely since it would have been against the interests of landowners, who needed the peasants to provide labor (1988: 64–65).

There seems to be limited evidence of the systematic savagery described by Chinese writers, at least since the late nineteenth century. There was a famous case of mutilation as a punishment in 1924, but the officials involved were themselves punished by the 13th Daiai Lama for this action; he had banned all such punishments in a proclamation in 1913 (Goldstein 1989: 123–26, 61). A case of judicial eye gouging in 1934 as a punishment for treason was clearly exceptional, since no one living knew how to carry it out (Goldstein 1989: 208–9). On the other hand, there are hundreds of reports, many of them firsthand accounts, of Tibetan political prisoners being severely tortured in Chinese prisons during the early 1990s, as well as almost ninety cases of suspicious deaths in custody (see, e.g., TCHRD 2005), none of which have been independently investigated.

The more important question is why Chinese officials raise the issue of conditions in pre-1959 Tibet at all. They are entitled to argue that these might tell us something about the views of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan rulers at that time, although this would ignore the efforts of the 13th and 14th Dalai Lamas to ameliorate the social system (in 1913, for example, the 13th Dalai Lama declared an amnesty for all serfs who had run away from their landlords and gave all vacant land to whoever was working it), let alone the attempts of senior officials like Lungshar and Künphel to reform the system. But the issue is hardly relevant, since a country is not entitled to take over a neighbor merely because social or political conditions there are backward. In addition, human rights are not usually judged by improvement, as if they were economic statistics, but by whether or not they meet current international standards. A regime does not normally argue that its abuses are justified because they are less than those of a regime half a century earlier; racism in contemporary America would not be considered acceptable even if it were in a form less odious than, say, lynchings in the 1950s. The social practices of a previous regime are only of marginal relevance to the human rights practices of its successor.

In any case, China made no claims at the time of its invasion or liberation of Tibet to be freeing Tibetans from social injustice. It declared then only that it was liberating them from “imperialism” (meaning British and U.S. interference). The issue of freeing Tibetans from feudalism appeared in Chinese rhetoric only after around 1954 in eastern Tibet and 1959 in central Tibet (Goldstein 1986: 109n2). Its justification then became that it was freeing them from class oppression. In the 1980s, this also changed: it now claims to be freeing them from “backwardness,” or lack of modernization.

Chinese references to preliberation conditions in Tibet thus appear to be aimed at creating popular support for Beijing’s project in Tibet. These claims have particular resonance among people who share the assumption—based on nineteenth-century Western theories of “social evolution” that are still widely accepted in China—that certain forms of society are “backward” and should be helped to evolve by more “advanced” societies. This form of prejudice converges with some earlier Chinese views and with vulgar Marxist theories that imagine a vanguard movement liberating the oppressed classes or nationalities in a society, whether or not those classes agree that they are oppressed. Moreover, the Chinese have to present that oppression as very extensive, and that society as very primitive, in order to explain why there were no calls by the Tibetan peasantry for Chinese intervention on their behalf.

The question of Tibet’s social history is therefore highly politicized, and Chinese claims in this respect are intrinsic to the functioning of the PRC, and not some free act of intellectual exploration. They have accordingly to be treated with caution. From a human rights point of view, the question of whether Tibet was feudal in the past is irrelevant. A more immediate question is why the PRC does not allow open discussion of whether Tibet was feudal or oppressive. Writers and researchers in Tibet face serious repercussions if they do not concur with official positions on issues such as social conditions in Tibet prior to its “liberation,” and in such a restrictive climate, the regime’s claims on this issue have little credibility.

#78040: - Re: Re: Re: Zloděj lidumilem 

 už rozumím, proč Havel tolik horoval za Tibet a dalajlámu, oba volali po návratu feudálních pořádků, dobré dílo se díky jejich následovníkům už brzy podaří alespoň v Evropě

#78039: - Re: Re: Re: Zloděj lidumilem 

 Zkuste přeci jen nejdříve studovat, než se pustíte do psaní komunistických hesel. 

#78044: - Re: Bulvární hodnocení politicky-ekonomického systému Tibetu jsou spíše naprostý blábol, mimo jiné.. 

#78045: - Re: Re: Re: Re: Zloděj lidumilem 

 Mnohokrát jsme komentoval, je hovadina, aby seriozní věděc napsal o komunistickém vraždění v tibetu, že se jednalo o "demokratické reformy". 

Tůma je nejspíš ruský troll. 

Navíc nelze předjímat, jak bohatý a krásný by byl Tibet dnes např. díky cestovnímu ruchu a další skoro stovce let rozvoje budhismu. 

#78047: - Re: Re: Bulvární hodnocení politicky-ekonomického systému Tibetu jsou spíše naprostý blábol, mimo ji 

 To je heslo, nic jste neprokázal, dokonce nejste schopen oponovat ani můj naprosto snadný argument, nekorelace budhismu s bulvární představou politického systému v Tibetu a nejst schopen ani komentovat usvědčení bulváru s pravděpodbné lži o průměrném věku v Tibetu. 

Naproti tomu, já mohu přidat např. projevy komunisty Miloše Zemana a prokázat, že jsou dokonce přímo postaveny na lžích, jak jsem v této diskusi mnohokrát učinil. 

Nejprve studujte. 

Mimochodem bulvární představu politického systému Tibetu lze nalézt jen na rusko trollých serverech a podivných propagandistických serverech, nikoliv na důvěryhodných zdrojích informací. Seriózní zdroje se tuto bulvarizovanou představu ani nesnaží vyvrace, ale uvádějí na pravou míru jen slova otrok a nevolník. 

#78049: - Re: Re: Re: Bulvární hodnocení politicky-ekonomického systému Tibetu jsou spíše naprostý blábol, mim 

 Že je americká neziskovka nedůvěryhodná je prostě fakt, se kterým nic nenaděláte. Nikde žádnou nekorelaci nevidím, buhismus je náboženství jako každé jiné. U nás se křesťané ve středověku chovali stejně. Naštěstí díky Číně v Tibetu středověk skončil.